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ABSTRACT
The viewpoint of Schubert M. Ogden and Lewis S. Ford set the boundaries for the way God acts
towards His creatures through revelation in both a general and special way. First, a comparison
of their viewpoints will be given to prove this claim. Both men followed separate lines of
process philosophy (Whitehead and Hartshorne) in order to reach their theological concepts of
revelation. The effects of Hartshorne on Ogden led him finally to conceive of God as an
Immanent Individual who can act originally in an authentic revelation to man, who can receive
and respond to such an act by representing it as a special act. On the other hand, Ford's loyalty
to Whitehead's original contention that God is an actual entity leads him to depict God as one
who acts generally towards all creatures, and acts specifically through a special contingent
authentic revelation in continuity with the contingent response to humanity. Second, the process
model as a whole will be examined and challenged to see if the biblical concept of special
revelation can be interpreted adequately along process lines. Thus, we will see that process
theology cannot adequately reconcile itself with the biblical concept of special revelation
because its idea that every act of temporal self-creation is based on past efficient causes does not
allow something new (special) in a system that requires all events to be related. We will argue
that such disagreement with scripture stems from a failure to conceive the Resurrection of Jesus
as an objective act of God in an open universe. Our conclusion is that both men (Ogden and
Ford) may be in antithesis to one another, but they share the same dilemma with process
theology as a whole: an inability to align themselves with the biblical view of special revelation
as an objective event given propositionally and personally by God through scripture and Jesus to
all men.

8

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to compare the idea of revelation in the thought of two process
theo10gians--Schubert M. Ogden and Lewis S. Ford. Their concept of revelation is appropriate for our study
since I think both men set the boundaries for the way God acts toward his creatures in both a general and
special sense in accordance with Process Theology.
Ogden mainly follows the thought of Charles Hartshorne that God is a person. Though Hartshorne
followed Whitehead relative to God as bi-po1ar, he did not accept Whitehead's idea that there is a univocal
relation between "God as the primary actual entity and all other actual entities."] Rather, he made a modal
distinction between God (a necessary being) and the world (a contingent being). Thus, Hartshorne's God is
the universal ground for all contingency. 2 By saying this, he views God as a society of actual entities or a
person, since God's body "comprises a whole society of actual entities."3
Ogden follows Hartshorne's idea for a modal distinction between God and the world. He uses the
terms "absolute" and "relative" to show how God grounds the world. In terms of revelation, Ogden sees God
as an Immanent Individual who can act originally in an authentic revelation to man as a being who can
receive and respond to such an act by representing it as a special act.
Ford, on the other hand, follows Whitehead in believing that God is bi-po1ar as well as that a univocal
relation between God (a primary actual entity) and the world (all other actual entities) can be maintained. To
Ford, the idea that God is a society of beings can only explain how God is related to the wor1d. 4 It cannot
explain how the world is related to God. Thus, in terms of revelation, Ford considers God to be an actual
entity, a divine di-po1ar subjectivity (defmed as the Father) who acts towards all of his creatures. He can also
act through a special, contingent, authentic revelation in continuity with the contingent response of humanity.

1 Harold O. J. Brown, "Process Theology" in Tensions in Contemporaw Theology, ed. Stanley N. Gundry and
Alan F. Johnson (Chicago: Moody, 1976),255.

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4

Lewis S. Ford, The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism (philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 99.

9

For Ogden, a special act is brought about by a human act, and represents an authentic revelation.
Ogden considers such an act to be the renewing5 of an original act by re-presentation. For Ford, a special act
is given to men by God, who intensifies it in continuity with a contingent human response. This special
action is the intensification6 of an original act by contingent actualization. So, they agree that God acts in a
special sense but differ on how God's action becomes special.

5

Schubert M. Ogden, The Point of Christology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982),58-63.

6

Ford, The Lure of God, 124.
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THE SYSTEMATIC MEANING OF REVELATION
According to Ogden, in his essay, "On Revelation," any account of the meaning of revelation that is
to be systematically adequate must pass two tests. These criteria are appropriateness and understandability.
Ogden claims,
Correspondingly, the burden of theological criticism is always to assess
conventional rationalizations, thereby eliminating those that can no longer
be maintained and, so far as possible, indicating others whereby the claims
of the Christian witness may still be vindicated. 7
Thus, for Ogden the criteria of appropriateness and understandability are two relevant tests which can
adequately defend the claims of the Christian witness. We need to discuss each criterion in detail.
The flrst end which theological reflection must pursue is given by the criterion of appropriateness. A
theological statement can pass it by establishing its congruence with the canonical

witness (the Jesus-

kerygma). 8 Ogden explains, however, that '''the witness of faith of the New Testament'" is rather "the object
of theological interpretation than its datum and that, therefore all attempts to test the appropriateness of
systematic statements are bound to be circular.,,9 So, appropriateness is necessary to establish the adequacy of
systematic statements; nevertheless, it is also a circular test and thus insufficient.
Since congruence with the canonical witness (the Jesus-kerygma) is an insufflcient test, for Ogden, it
cannot be the only criterion for systematic adequacy. 10 Ogden insists that systematic statements also claim to
be "meaningful [existential] and true [di-polar theistic]"Y They "render themselves subject to the criterion of
understandability.,,12 Hence, the second end which theological reflection must pursue is the criterion of

7 Schubert M. Ogden, "On Revelation," Our Common History as Christians: Essays in Honor Albert C. Outler, ed. John
Deschner, Leroy T. Howe, Klaus Renzel (New York: Oxford University Press), 261-292.

8

Schubert M. Ogden, "What is Theology," Journal of Religion 52 (1972).

9

Ogden, "On Revelation," 263.

10

Ogden, "What is Theology," 22.

11

Ogden, "On Revelation," 264.

12

Ibid., 263.

11

•

understandability/3 that is, it must defend its meaning and truth "in accordance with completely general
criteria, themselves critically established.,,14 Ogden admits, however, that this criterion is also circular. 15
Ogden also recognizes that human experience must be verified by human experience before it can become the
subject of understanding. Nevertheless, the task of Christian theology is to pursue these two ends, thereby
establishing "the fully reflective understanding of the Christian witness of faith as decisive for human
existence.,,16

In conclusion, a theological assertion (systematic statement) must be appropriate and

understandable to the Apostolic witness which is the norm for all theological assertions. However, Ogden
recognizes that appropriateness and understandability are relative criteria, not absolute criteria. Each has a
distinctive task but each presupposes the other. Ogden, in following Bultmann's lead, maintains that within
the New Testament's own idea of revelation, there are, to be sure, two implied ideas.
The first idea, Ogden declares, is that man's salvation "so entirely depends on the saving action of
God that without the revelation by which that action occurs the only future of man would be death.,,17 On this
idea,
not only is every man as such utterly dependent on the prevenient action of
God for his authentic life, but that action takes place precisely as a
revelation, as a manifestation of God himself to a being capable of receiving
and responding to such a manifestation. 18
The second idea which is implied in the New Testament's idea of revelation is that revelation has
occurred decisively in Jesus Christ. This idea of revelation (that is, "revelation-incarnation") can be seen in
the particular history of Jesus of Nazareth as presented in Scripture.

13

Ogden, "What is Theology," 22.

14

Ogden, "On Revelation," 263.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.

12
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He defines the flrst idea as the "original presentation of God to every human understanding," or
original revelation; and the second idea as the "re-presentation of God to men," or special, decisive
revelation. 19 Both conceptions are correlated with Ogden's own idea of the two senses in which God acts in
history. We will discuss each conception in tum.

19

Ibid., 264,269.

13
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ORIGINAL REVELATION
Insofar as religious language is existential and insofar as human experience is not exhausted by sense
perception, we must enjoy an internal awareness of ourselves, and of our world as parts of the absolute. 20 For
we exist as human only because of an inalienable assurance that our lives are both real and significant.
Human reflection must understand the absolute so that our elemental confidence can make proper sense; and
as a result, religious language results from such reflection.
Reflection means to inquire about

certain presuppositions of experience and justify them by

common, shared experience. "As one reflects upon his presuppositions and moral experiences, he fmds that
he believes in God." While it is the nature of myth, but not the New Testament's original intention, to
obscure the absolute or the cause it serves, such statements can be both meaningful and true, without at the
same time being scientific or historical.

The complete existential-metaphysical meaning of myth is to

illuminate the present, not the past or the future.

Therefore, the true purpose of Christian doctrines like

creation and redemption is to illuminate each present moment of our existence as a part of the absolute. Thus
these doctrines actually teach us that God is the Being of beings or unbound love, as decisively re-presented
in Jesus Christ, who is the outer word which all men need for the objectification of their becoming.
(The word "re-presents" explains Ogden's idea that Jesus is only a manifestation of salvation. Thus,
the event of Jesus himself is conceived by Ogden as a historical occurrence as well as an act of God in history,
though not exclusive. However, Jesus as a re-presentation of God is decisive.)
To assume that the only criteria of theological statements (appropriateness and understandability) are
already established with our existence itself is to declare that the only eternal object of theological or
human reflection must be the mystery of human existence. This mystery is a manifestation of God himself,
according to the New Testament's understanding of revelation. Ogden writes,
On this understanding, not only is every man as such utterly dependent on
the prevenient action of God for his authentic life, but that action takes place

20

Ogden, "Unbolll1ded Love," The Perkins School of Theology, XIX, 3 (Spring, 1967).

14
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precisely as a revelation, as a manifestation of God himself to a being
capable of receiving and responding to such a manifestation. 21
Revelation "in one sense of the word properly designates the original event that is constitutive not
only of Christian existence but also of human existence in general or simply as such. ,,22 A concept of
revelation, as being meaningful and true, must include an analogical speaking of God, as well as his action.
For both original and special revelation have existential significance, and the immediate reference of original
revelation refers to man and his possibilities of decision, whereas the mediate reference of special revelation
refers to the being of God, as Creator and Redeemer.

Ogden maintains that Paul, as well as the New

Testament as a whole, presupposes that God is "implicitly understood to be not merely one being among
others, even the greatest, but in the phrase of the later theological tradition, the being of all beings--the one
strictly transcendental individual whose individuality is constitutive of reality as such.,,23
As the ultimate ground of every event, Ogden asserts that God can be nothing more than our
Creator. 24 In like manner, to say that God is Redeemer is to say that the ultimate end of every event is the
everlasting life of God. "Precisely as transcendent, as the one transcendental individual distinct from all
others, God is and must be immanent in all things as their primal ground, even as they are immanent in him as
their final end. ,,25 Thus if anything is to be experienced or understood, then God must be experienced. This
then brings us to the point of human existence, because the existential question has two aspects -- God and
human existence.
We can only exist because of an inalienable assurance that our lives are both real and significant, and
we can only understand through human reflection the absolute so that our elemental confidence can make
proper sense. For "one may say that man, as the New Testament intends to speak of him, is a being who not

21

Ogden, "On Revelation," 264.

22

Ibid., 264.

23

Ibid., 265.

24

Ibid.

25

David Brown, Doctrine of God (Basil: Blackwell, 1987), 50.
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only exists and experiences but also understands.,,26 Ogden writes, "Man is or becomes man only because or
insofar as he relates himself understandingly, and thus is in freedom and responsibility, to both his own
existence and the world around him.,,27
Even though there is a need for a special revelation and a revelation-incarnation that meets such a
need, this still does not imply that the revelation in Jesus Christ as an objectification of the ultimate mystery is
necessary as constitutive event of our authentic possibility. We must first be understandingly related to God.
Since the ultimate ground of every event is God's decision of pure unbounded love, then he can be
nothing more than our Creator; in like manner, to say that God is Redeemer is to say that the ultimate end of
every event is the everlasting life of God. Ogden explains that
... if God does and must exist necessarily, and thus must somehow be
understood if anything at all is understood, the constitutive event of selfunderstanding can only include an understanding of God. Man is or
becomes man only because or insofar as, in understanding himself and his
world, he also relates himself understandingly to God's gift and demand.,,28
So, given the New Testament's presupposition concerning revelation, "God himself is present to every man
simply as such in the event in which, being present to himself and his world, man is ipso facto present to
God.,,29
Since it is the nature of myth to obscure the absolute or the cause it definitely serves, such statements
can become both meaningful and true, without being scientific or historical. And if this is so, "there also is no
great difficulty in rationalizing the appropriateness to Scripture of theology's characteristic acknowledgment
throughout most of its long history of something like a 'natural revelation,"'3o or original revelation.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.

28

Schubert M. Ogden, "The Reformation that We Want," Anglican Theological Review, 54/4 (October 1972).

29

Ogden, "On Revelation," 266.

30

Ibid., 267.
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SPECIAL REVELATION
There is such a thing as a difference between a full and adequate revelation of our existence and a
constitutive revelation of our authentic existence. As free, we creatures must crave the revelation which fully
objectifies our existence. Ogden writes,
As Bultman rightly emphasizes, what the New Testament itself says about
revelation includes the further idea that it has occurred decisively in the
special event of Jesus Christ, and that again and again takes place in the
present in the witness and faith of which that event is the principle as well
as the origin...which is to say, the re-presentation of God to men that has
taken place through the particular strand of human history of which Jesus of
Nazareth is the center.3!
This is the primary sense of revelation in the New Testament. Ogden adds that from New Testament times to
the present the sense of revelation that was held most prominent in Christian theology was special revelation.
Indeed, there are some that even think that special revelation is the only type there is. He uses Tillich as a
representative of such thinking. "Thus it follows that everything religion has to say about God, including his
qualities, actions, and manifestations, has a symbolic character and that the meaning of God is completely
missed if one takes the symbolic language literally.,,32 Tillich is acknowledging that, in some sense, revelation
is universal, and he implies that special revelation "of some sort of or other is the only type of revelation there
is." Tillich considers revelation as the "self-manifestation of ultimate mystery in a special miraculous event
received in an ecstatic experience." Ogden writes, "How opposed Tillich is to the whole concept of the
original revelation is clear from his rejection of any notion of an inner word or an inner revelation as being a
mystical, idealist, spiritualist notion that leads only too easily to rationalism.'>33 "Against the doctrine of the
inner word," he adds, "Christian theology must maintain the doctrine of the word as a medium of revelation,
symbolically the doctrine of the word of God.,,34 My point here is to show Ogden's misgivings about those

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

33

Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 125ff. LV.

34

Ibid.

17

who only speak of special revelation. One cannot forget original revelation. Original revelation, according to
Ogden, is constitutive of every human existence. For Ogden, Tillich's view of special revelation overlooked
the necessity of original revelation and thus is untenable because it cannot do justice to the idea that God is
implicitly our Redeemer. Tillich's concept of special revelation can only show that God is explicitly our
Creator and not that God is implicitly our Redeemer. Moreover, Tillich's viewpoint only allows us to speak
symbolically of God. Ogden feels that it is necessary to speak of symbolically of God as well. Thus, God is
now the one who is explicitly the Creator and implicitly the Redeemer, symbolically.
To employ the distinction used in recent Roman Catholic theology, I could
say that what is generally meant by revelation in the theological treatises is
not transcendental revelation but categorical (or predicamental revelation).35
Special Revelation As Not Properly Supernatural

In what sense, then, is special revelation necessary? Initially, this question must be approached from
the opposite direction. That is, we must determine in what sense special revelation is not necessary. Ogden
rejects the view that the revelation in Jesus Christ presents the fmal truth of Christianity because the New
Testament does not characteristically appeal to this particular idea. 36 He maintains that the New Testament
depicts the idea that both original and special revelations have existential significance.

Protestant neo-

orthodoxy and progressive Roman Catholic theology concur with this understanding of revelation instead of
the traditional understanding of revelation as supernatural knowledge. He contends that "not only Protestant
neo-orthodoxy but, increasingly, progressive Roman Catholic theology as well, provide abundant evidence
that any understanding of revelation as primarily the communication of supernatural knowledge has now been
overcome.,,37

35

Ogden, "On Revelation," 270.

36

Ibid., 272.

37

Ibid.
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-Like Rahner, he rejects those 38 who believe in the supernatural occurrence of special revelation.
Rahner argues that special revelation is given in the same implicit fashion as transcendental revelation.
It may be that theological reflection is faced with truths which cannot easily
be brought together--the truth [sic], namely, that grace is from without
through the particular time-bound intervention of the sacramental sign.39

But to believe in this idea as Rahner suggests is to fmd oneself in a serious dilemma. That is, one is incapable
of explaining the necessity of Jesus Christ since special revelation is given transcendentally to every human
existence. Ogden explains, "even if there is a "more" to revelation and faith that is strictly supernatural, if this
"more" belongs, or, in case of faith, can belong, to man quite apart from Christian revelation, it can hardly
serve to explain the necessity of that revelation.,,40 That is, if we accept Rahner's view, then we can possess
no type of revelation that can understand and make proper sense of our inalienable assurance as men in the
form of incarnationaI human reflection. To put it simply, we do not have any type of revelation-incarnation or
objectification for our existence.
For Ogden there is no distinction between nature and grace in the New Testament (or in the Old).
Even if Catholic theologians could consistently claim more than this,
however, they would still be faced with a more serious objection, which
also applies to the understanding typical of much Protestant neo-orthodoxy.
This is the objection that the whole distinction between nature and grace,
the natural and the supernatural, must be regarded with profound suspicion
from the standpoint of the New Testament, as well as of Scripture
generally.41
However, he does believe that there is a difference between original and special revelation. Thus, Ogden
challenges Tillich and Rahner because, in one way or another, they both deny the difference in original and
special revelation; Rahner mixes original and special revelation. He (Rahner) says that grace is within and

38

Ibid., 273.

39

Karl Rahner, "Secular Life and the Sacraments," The Tablet, 22. 6822 and 6823 (1971) in Ogden "On Revelation", 290.

40

Rahner, The Tablet, pp. 236ff. and 267f. in Ogden "On Revelation", 273.

41

Ogden, "On Revelation", 224.
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>
comes from without.

But Ogden wants to know that if the grace of that revelation which is within is

sufficient, then why do we need the grace that comes from without.
So, in Ogden's opinion, neither traditional Christianity nor the Revisionist can prove adequately to

him that special revelation is necessary.

Special revelation must be taken to mean that it is the full

objectification of original revelation. This is what makes special revelation necessary to him. Also, it allows

him to emphasize transcendental revelation and deny that special revelation (categorical revelation) is for
Christians today.
The Content of Special Revelation

Special revelation, to be sure, does not have different content from original revelation. Thus, there
can be no material difference between original and special revelation.
It is, however, just this claim that special revelation has a different content
from original revelation that the New Testament sharply calls into question.
This is sufficiently evident from the reflection that, since a merely partial
divine relation can, at most, establish a merely partial human responsibility,
it cannot possibly be what Paul intends to assert in Rom. 1: 18ff. And what
does he mean there by the power of God, which he asserts that God has
manifested to every man, if not the very thing of which he speaks when he
says in a preceding verse that the gospel is the power of God for salvation
for everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the Greek (vs. 16), or
witnesses elsewhere that Christ crucified is precisely Christ the power of
God and the wisdom of God (I Cor. 1:23-24).42

To Ogden, the content of special revelation as an incarnation is needed, without affirming that it is
necessary to authentic existence.43 Moreover, we can claim that the sacrificial life and death of Jesus is
necessary without claiming that the content of such revelation can accomplish anything other than manifesting
a certain human possibility, which declares God's everlasting purpose to redeem us with his love. To him, the
special revelation uses the language of sacrifice as a way of expressing the absolute as myth. The sacrificial
work of Christ does not, then, constitute our authentic existence but rather reveals it with full decisiveness.

42

Ibid., 275.

43

Ibid.
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--Denying a distinction between nature and grace, Bultmann had worked out a system by which he
could affirm a distinctive "more" of special revelation. For Bultmann maintained that our response to original
revelation should be considered as something that lies in the past. We need, therefore, a special revelation to
restore our original possibility.
The revelation of God brings no knowledge about the mysteries of other
worlds; in fact, it communicates nothing even about God that any reflective
person could not know about himself--namely, that man can receive his life
by God's grace only in radical solitariness before him. No revelation needs
to tell me what God's grace means. One thing alone it tells me, and with
that it tells me everything: 'This grace holds good for thee!' And because it
tells me this in the words, 'Thy sin is forgiven thee!' it opens my eyes to the
fact that the fIrst and last sin of man is to want to be himself by his own
power.44
Ogden challenges this view also,45 claiming that one can "call into question either God's goodness or his
power.,,46 He writes, "either God is after all not who he is assumed to be, or else there is no human being who
is ever simply without God's grace to save, and hence without the possibility of authentic faith.,,47 God's act
must be interpreted as the action whereby he participates effectively in his creatures and thus lays "the ground
for the next stage of the creative process.,,48 "For Bultmann's own insistence still stands, that faith is by no
means merely a human capacity or disposition that may be more or less fully developed.'>49 To put it simply,
if man is without God's grace, then God does not will that all men should be saved.

44 Harden asks, "If Bultmann was inconsistent when he broke with philosophy to affinn the necessity of Christ for man's
salvation, as Ogden charges, is not Ogden equally inconsistent when he breaks with philosophy to affinn the necessity of
Scriptural revelation for theology? Must not the philosopher consider that Ogden's nonn is arbitrary? Is Ogden's theologian
bound to a particular text, while the philosopher can gain the same truth by roaming freely through the human experience?"
I must respond in the negative. Ogden does not break with philosophy in order to affinn the necessity of scriptural revelation
since theology, for Ogden, is correlative in nature--that is, a special revelation is not a new possibility but rather defends
philosophy. William Harden, New Directions In Theology Today, vol. 1 (philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966),48-49.
RudolfBultmann as quoted in Ogden "On Revelation".

45

Ogden, "On Revelation," 279.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid., 280.

48

Ogden, "In What Sense Does God Act in History," 11.

49

Ibid.
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Ogden attempts first and foremost to show the "more" of special revelation and, at the same time,
states that God desires all to be saved. He believes that man cannot lose his possibility of authentic life. To
state that God acts naturally means that man is never without the possibility of faith. The necessity of special
revelation lies in its ability to be an adequate and full response to original revelation.
The kerygma or the revelation of Jesus Christ is, according to Ogden, an "imperative call to
existential decision, in which case it is demonstrably independent of any particular historical event."so The

kerygma must coincide with original revelation as its objectification or full utterance. That which is important
to Ogden is neither the actualization of faith nor the full objectification of it, but rather the possibility of
authentic faith as from God himself. To Ogden, this viewpoint "entails neither a superfIcial understanding of
sin nor a simple identification of faith with theistic belief."sl (Faith is an implicit presupposition as the
necessary condition of a possibility of what one thinks, says, or does.) Such a view allows one to say that
"authentic faith in God is indeed more than explicit belief in him, even while insisting that it is and remains
every man's possibility."s2
Moreover, the scriptural witness verifies this idea. For the scriptural witness concludes that the only
possibility of authentic faith is the original presentation of God to us.
I am convinced that none of the rationalizations of Christian revelation as
necessary even to the possibility of man's authenticity can continue to be
maintained--and that, not because they all fail to meet certain criteria of
meaning and truth but because, as I have tried to indicate, they do not pass
the primary test of agreeing with the scriptural witness. s3
Special revelation separates original revelation into different traditions.
Granted that original revelation, and thus the possibility of authentic faith, is
constitutive of every human existence as such, it by no means follows that

50 Schubert M. Ogden, "Bultmann's Demythologizing and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy," Joumal of Religion
37 (1957),169.

51

Ogden, "On Revelation," 281.

52

Ibid.

53

Ibid., 281.
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men universally are explicitly aware, with full and adequate consciousness,
of this fact and all that it involves. 54
When God actualizes his essence in every creature and when every creature reflects and expresses God's
action, then every creature becomes what it is. "Such religion as he [man] has, as distinct from the faith of
which it is the objectification, is not natural but historical, and so available to him only as one religion among
others, as one more or less reflective response to God's original revelation.,,55 He goes on to state that, "at the
base of every religion, as its origin and principle, is some particular occasion of insight, of reflective grasp
through concept and symbol, of the mystery manifested in original revelation.,,56 It is clear to Ogden that we
need Jesus Christ for our becoming.

Therefore, we must defme Jesus as an objectification of God's

unboundless love. If this is true, Ogden maintains, special revelation must be taken as that which is for all
humanity.

By stating this, Ogden intends to eliminate the idea that Jesus is necessary for the Christian

believer only.
Special Revelation as the "Outer Word"

All religions exist on the basis of some event of special revelation, for our understanding of ourselves
IS

reflective and becomes clear only when it is properly objectified. Hence, Ogden argues that special

revelation is necessary for all; it is by no means only for Christians. All men have original possibility but they
are not aware of it explicitly. Thus, as humans, not merely as Christians, we need special revelation in order
to objectify our existence. That is, we can only live by the word or special revelation. Ogden explains:
Although it is often obscured in theological discussions, there is an
important difference between afftrming something to be necessary to the
full and adequate revelation of our existence and affirming the necessity of
that same thing for the very constitution of our existence in its authentic
possibility. 57
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56 Ibid.
57 Ogden, "The Refonnation is What We Want," 267.
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The principal task of human reflection is to understand original revelation, to express that our lives
are real as well as ultimately significant. s8 "Consequently, insofar as the God who is presented to him in all
his experience and understanding is also represented to him through explicit concepts and symbols, he is
confronted with a special revelation that may indeed claim to be decisive for his existence."s9 He states,
"inevitably, then, there is the wide variety of religious insights and traditions, each with its claim to be tme.,,60
In principle, we are all able to re-present God. This is so only if what we re-present actually does signify

God's action as Creator and Redeemer, as the ultimate reality who is unbounded love, as gift and demand.
Hence, we, through the outer word of God's love, re-present our understanding of God's primordial action.
Moreover, according to Ogden, we re-present God's action itself. Ogden proclaims, "indeed, we
may go further and say that, in this case, man's action actually is God's action ...".61
Human actions indicate what we actually are.

They are self-representations in history.

Yet,

whenever one of our acts expresses the deep reflection that God is Creator and Redeemer, then such an act is
unlike other acts. 62 Such an action might be a symbolic and intentional act of word or deed. When particular
religious symbols appropriately re-present God's attribute action as Creator and Redeemer, these religious
words and deeds in tum become special acts of God.
But these intentional religious symbols or special acts are not the only acts of God. All actions are,
inasmuch as they are received by someone as re-presenting God's di-polar attributes of Creation and
Redemption, acts of God, since it is the nature of all creatures to declare God's being and actions. Now some,
Ogden argues, may say that we can only discern the symbolic meaning of events in special revelation. But
this is not the case, he responds. For him, special revelation is derived, not original, and we should not argue

58 John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (philadelphia: Westminster,
1976).
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that God's action is found only in special revelation since it is, at most only human confrontation with
events.
Whenever an event is thought to express God as Creator and Redeemer, it is unlike like other events.
Events of words and deeds are such special acts of God. When particular religious symbols appropriately represent God as Creator and Redeemer, they are special acts.
Any event is an act of God insofar as it is received by someone as God's action. It is, thus, an act of
God for it is in the nature of all creatures to declare God's being and action.

However, an event can

"misrepresent the common structure of all our experiences" and, therefore, it cannot be considered as an act
of God.
The Necessity of Special Revelation

We must affirm that special revelation is needed without affirming that such event is necessary to
authentic existence: we must affIrm that this revelation is necessary without afflrming that it can accomplish
anything other than declaring a certain human possibility. "Although such revelation cannot be necessary to
the constitution of human existence, it can very well be necessary to the objectifIcation of existence, in the
sense of its full and adequate understanding at the level of explicit thought and speech.,,63 Ogden writes, "Not
only is there no other light shining in Jesus than has always already shined in the creation, but no saving act of
God occurs in him other than that which never fails to occur as soon and as long as there is any distinctively
human being.,,64
As Kierkegaard understood it, there can only be two understandings of authentic existence. Ogden
points out that:
We may observe, to begin with, that Kierkegaard's formulation of the
alternatives in this connection is on the face of it inexhaustive. 65 As he
presents them, there are two basically different understandings of existence
63 Ibid., 284.
64 Ibid., 285.
65 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments: Or a Fragment of Philosophy, Trans. David F. Swenson and Howard V.
Hong (rev. ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) pp. 18f. In Ogden, "On Revelation," n. 24.
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between which one must choose: the Socratic understanding according to
which no event is constitutive of man's authentic possibility. He already
possesses it implicitly prior to any events.
Kierkegaard's own
understanding, according to which some event is constitutive, is that man
alone is given the possibility that he does not already possess, not even
implicitly.66
But Ogden considers a third alternative. He adds,
There remains, if only as 'a project of thought,' a third understanding,
according to which every event is constitutive of man's possibility, because,
while it is in no way his eternal possession, it is given to him at least
implicitly in every event that is constitutive of his existence. 67
Whereas Socrates maintains that no type of event brings salvation, Kierkegaard perceives that salvation must
come by way of some decisive event. Ogden discerns that man's authentic possibility is constitutive of every
event. By choosing the third alternative, Ogden does not want to identify any theistic beliefs as essential for
salvation. Ogden sees Kierkegaard as setting things up so that this would be the case. Hence, he challenges
Kierkegaard's either-or.

For Ogden, man has original revelation but needs special revelation only as a

reminder or objectification, and, thus, as a guide to adjudicate all the claims and counter-claims of various
religions.
Special revelation cannot be the "explication of the eternal truths of theism."68 As "nothing other
than the full and adequate objectification of original revelation, original revelation itself is always and only an
event--an event occurring in time, and so nothing merely eternal.,,69 "As the objectification of God's original
revelation in every present, it is the re-presentation of his love itself as the ever new gift and demand of my
existence.,,7o
In sum: What Christian revelation reveals to man is nothing new, since such
truths as it makes explicit must already be known to him implicitly in every
moment of his existence. But that this revelation occurs does reveal
66
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something new to him in that, as itself event it is the occurrence in his
history of the transcendent event of God's 10ve. 71
As

historical beings, we need Christian revelation.

necessary.

Ogden interprets Chtistian revelation as relatively

That is, Christian revelation is relatively necessary to human existence, not to the object of

Christian faith.
Hence, that which makes Christian revelation a revelation is the fact of "its occurrence and that it is
with respect to this fact that it is the decisive revelation of something new: God's 'new creation' in Christ,
and so man's authentic possibility of 'faith working through love' (2 Cor. 5: 17; Gal. 6:15, 5:6).,,72
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REVELATION AND THE CHRISTOLOGICAL ASSERTION
According to Ogden, the external criterion of authority is not the New Testament or even the Old, but
rather the apostolic witness which is prior to the tradition of the New Testament. 73 The apostolic witness is
itself the norm of appropriateness. It bears witness to Jesus, the real subject of the Christological Assertion.
Ogden explains that:
What is central in the Jesus-kerygma is the actual witness of Jesus himself,
his proclamation of the nearness of God's reign, his table fellowship with
the outcasts in anticipation of the eschatological meal, his exorcisms of
demons, his summons to faith with the promise or threat that the coming
Son of Man will judge according to his hearers' present response to his own
words and deeds. In other words, so far as the Jesus-kerygma is concerned,
Jesus is re-presented as the one who through his words and deeds in the
present places everyone whom he encounters in the immediate presence of
God whose gift and demand is love· 74
He defmes the apostolic witness as that which is accessible to us by "historical-critical analysis ofthe
earliest layer of Christian tradition or kerygma," from which "alone the true canon within the canon is to be
discemed.,,75 It is to be discerned only by critical interpretation.

Moreover, it is the witness to which

theological assertion (or in our case any systematic account of revelation) must be appropriate. He writes,
"Accordingly, the witness to which theological assertions must be appropriate is not scriptural witness
typically spoken of in most post liberal Protestant theology but, rather, the apostolic witness, which is to be
discerned by critical interpretation of this earliest layer of Christian tradition or kerygma.,,76 Hence, the basis
of the traditional source of authority, scripture and tradition, is the apostolic witness, which is found in the

73 John Hick, "Jesus or The Apostolic Message?" Journal of Religion, 6411, 1984,362-368.
74 Schubert M. Ogden, unpublished lecture "On Christ," p. 4 as cited in John J. O'Donnell, Triuity and Temporarily (New
York: Oxford Uuiversity Press, 1983),57.
75
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New Testament. 77

Thus the apostolic witness plays the role of theological nOlTIl, since the existential-

historical Jesus, or the true subject of Christological Assertion authorizes it. 78
If this witness is to be found in the New Testament, the authority of scripture is no greater than its
higher authority--the apostolic witness. 79 For "the locus of the auctoritas canonica is not the New Testament
itself, to say nothing of the Old, but the apostolic witness that is prior to the New Testament, although
accessible to us today only by way of historical reconstruction from it.,,80 He writes that "relative to Christ
himself and to the apostolic witness that alone is directly authorized by him, there is no difference in principle,
but only in fact, between the authority of Scripture, on the one hand, and that of the church's tradition and
magisterium on the other.,,81
The early church's explicit Christology was a response to Jesus' proclamation of utter decisiveness
to be God's gift and demand. He confronted his hearers with God's prevenient action. Since Jesus only
affIlTIled an implicit Christology, there is no explicit Christology to be found in the apostolic witness. 82 He
explains,
Even though Jesus hardly thought and spoke of himself as the Christ or the
Son of Man, he evidently did point to himself in his word as being of
decisive significance, in that already through him God was confronting his
hearers with the gift and demand of boundless love and thus with the
possibility of authentic existence in faith. Consequently, in thinking and
speaking of Jesus as the Christ or as the Son of Man, the early church
affmned explicitly, in such telTIlS and categories as were available for the
purpose, Jesus' own implicit claim to be the decisive revelation of God's
10ve. 83
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Thus, the church added extraneous assumptions about Christ to the decisive engagement, by which he
confronted them with God's gift and demand of unboundless love. "By affirming that Jesus' own Christology
was at most implicit, it takes account of the fact that there is no explicit Christology in the earliest stratum of
Christian witness.,,84

This means that the apostolic witness makes assumptions about Jesus "that are

empirical-historical in character.,,85 Even so, what it really teaches is that Jesus has decisive significance.
Ogden records, "They not only seem to assume that Jesus proclaimed or taught certain things or acted in
certain ways, but also that he had a certain understanding of himself and his ministry that led him to confront
his hearers with an extraordinary claim."86 Thus, according to the apostolic witness, Jesus is not only a special
act of God, but also He is a decisive act or fmal revelation of God's action--he has distinct revelatory power. 87
For Ogden, we only have inferences from the secondary sources because the early Christians were
interested in reportage about Jesus.

Thus, the only sources for Jesus are the secondary witness of faith.

Ogden maintains that post-Bultmannian theology or proponents of the new quest for the historical Jesus left
things the way they found them and Marxen recognized this.

However, Ogden contends, that which is

empirical-historical for Marxen is the witness itself, or assertions about Jesus as He really is. Ogden desires
that we look behind scripture's formulations and fmd the Apostolic witness. So, "the quest for the historical
Jesus" should be taken as a quest for the Apostolic witness. That is, the norm (scripture, tradition) does not
come from a historical source (Apostolic witness), rather, the Apostolic witness is the norm of appropriation.
The event itself is contained within the witness to the event since Ogden holds the view that there is no
operational distinction between Jesus as He really was and Jesus as He is represented in the earliest source.

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 58.
87 Ogden, "In What Sense Does God Act in History," 16.
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--Hence, the apostolic witness makes assumptions about what Jesus really is--special or fmal
revelation. Therefore decisive revelation authorizes special revelation, and special revelation in tum declares
that decisive revelation is the source from which it derives its authority. He declares,
Assuming, as we must, that even this earliest stratum of Jesus-tradition is
witness of faith and not historical reportage, we have to allow for the
possibility that even what clearly seem to be assumptions about Jesus as he
actually was are really assertions about Jesus as he truly is--which is to say,
as he is believed to be by those who by means of such assertions intend to
bear witness to him as the decisive re-presentation of God. 88
Thus apostolic witness bears witness to Jesus as the decisive representation of God. In Him, "the ultimate
truth about our existence before God is normatively represented or revealed.,,89
Further, everything that is to be Christian (including the apostolic witness) must originate from the
christ-event. For
the event that the New Testament witness as such means in referring to
Jesus does indeed belong to the origin of the Christian church, and so is an
actual happening, prior to and independent of not only their own faith and
witness, but even the original faith and witness of the apostles in which
everything Christian originates. 90
The point of Christology is an existential point, and Christological assertions are existential
assertions. 91 The constitutive event is the revelation to which the Christian community responds with the
Christological assertion--Jesus is the Christ. Historic Christianity construes the religion about Jesus, not the
religion of Jesus, as normative. However, Ogden thinks that historic Christianity, by maintaining that the
religion of Jesus itself was explicitly Christological, falls into the same deception as liberalism, which
believed that the religion of Jesus was normative. Both were deceived, he claims. Historic Christianity
speaks of "certain historical conclusions" relative to a God-man Savior, whereas liberalism speaks of the same

88 Schubert M. Ogden, "The Point of Christology," 58.
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conclusion with respect to Jesus as merely human. He maintains that both positions have difficulties because
some theologians have adequately challenged the assumption that we know of Jesus' life from the Gospels.
In the Christological assertion, "Jesus is the Christ", Jesus, as the subject term, does not refer to a past
event or a potential revelation, but rather He is a present event or revelation. Ogden asserts that
what is meant by the subject term 'Jesus' in the constitutive Christological
assertion is not 'the so-called historical Jesus' but rather, 'the historical
biblical [sc. apostolic] Christ.' The referent of that term is not some past
figure or event behind the apostolic witness but the present figure and event
constitutive of and, in another sense, constituted by that very witness.92
That is, if "Jesus," as the subject term in the assertion, "Jesus is the Christ," were referred to as a past figure or
event, then the objective referent is the historical Jesus and not the Christ as re-presented by Jesus. As such,
the kerygma would refer to the past figure, Jesus, who actualized the Christ, instead of proclaiming the Christ
himself
Jesus must be taken as the one to whom the apostolic witness bears witness; namely, the one who is
the divine word addressed to us as actual occurrence. The outer word represents Jesus, not as a past figure
who actualized faith, but as the present event of the apostolic Christ, a re-presentation of God himself. The
teachings and death of Jesus represent the events of special revelation qua unity of past event and present
event. The kerygma must be taken as something instrumental to the revelatory event.
The Jesus-kerygma does not represent Christ as a new possibility. All men receive the authentic
possibility of God himself in every event. Ogden records, "There is not the slightest evidence that God has
acted in Christ in any way different from the way in which he primordially acts in every other event.,,93 God
does not act differently in Christ than in any other event. Christ by no means reveals a new possibility to us,
but only incarnates the unique event which is given to everyone implicitly. Christian revelation is an
92 For Ogden, "to say that I esus is the preacher of mankind in the sense of the decisive historical manifestation of the
essential God-man relationship is to say something quite different than that he is an accidental occasion through which some
timeless and impersonal truth can be appropriated by the intellect. Indeed, it is to say nothing less, though also nothing more,
than that in him the eternal Existence or thou in whom all truth is grounded is himself personally present." Ogden as quoted
in C.J. Curtis, Contemporary Protestant Thought (New York: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1970), 72. Ogden's unpublished
lecture "On Christ," p. 5 in O'Donnell, 63.
93 Schubert M. Ogden, "Bultmann's Demythologizing and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy," 10umal of Religion,
37 (1957), 159, 161.
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event which does reveal the action of God himself in his history. Yet that which is revealed in Jesus is
implicitly known to other men.
We need Christian revelation to reassure us of this basic confidence. We need the revelation in Jesus
to proclaim the unbounded love of God which is given to us since revelation comes via religious symbols.
Jesus Christ is the decisive Christian symbol. For the purpose of the revelation of Jesus is to defme salvation,
not actualize it: "The function of Christian revelation is not to limit man's consciousness of the sacred but to
defme it. ,,94
Ogden equates the special act of the human word with the revelation of the divine word addressed to
us. If Jesus is the Christ, then his resurrection is God's action to us. The New Testament represents it as
something instrumental to God's action, but it is God's own witness to Jesus as decisive.
Resurrection does not mean that 'the act of God' which the faith of Easter
signifies is yet another historical happening in space and time, subsequent to
the events of Jesus' life and death. The New Testament's representations of
it as though it were such a happening are undeniably mythological and
demand to be critically interpreted--and that, primarily for the sake of
expressing more appropriately its own distinctive reality as an act of God.
The crucial point, however, is that the witness of faith, which did originate
in at some time after. Jesus' crucifrxion is by no means something
completely independent or primary. On the contrary, it is by its very nature
the response to another and altogether different 'witness' on which it
absolutely depends, namely, the 'self attestation' of the risen Lord, or as the
New Testament also expresses it, God's own testimony to the decisive
significance of Jesus and his cross (cf. Rom. 1: 4).95
The revelation in Jesus' life qua actualization of God's purpose, is therefore not independent of the
resurrection of Christ. Similarly, the "deity" of Jesus is not independent of the "humanity" of God. Ogden
declares that:
Thus, what I properly mean when I assert that Jesus is 'divine' is that the
possibility here and now represented to me in the Christian witness of faith
is God's own gift and demand to my existence. On the other hand, what I
properly mean when I assert that God is 'human' is that I am here and now

94 Schubert M. Ogden, "Christliche Theologie und die neue Religiositat," in Chancen der Religion, ed. Rainer Volp
(Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus GerdMohn, 1975), p. 172 as cited by O'Donnell in Trinity and Temporality, 66.
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actually confronted with this possibility, that is actually re-presented to me
as a historical event and hence is not merely as idea or a general tmth.96
Thus, Jesus is the Christ not simply in the sense that he actualized and thereby vindicated the possibility of
faith, but rather because he makes it present to me as my possibilty.
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SUMMARY OF OGDEN
Ogden's thought relative to revelation started with the idea that a theological statement (systematic statement)
must be appropriate and understandable. Moreover, Ogden admits that any attempt to test the appropriateness
and understandability is necessarily circular. His reason for using these two tests stem from the idea of many
that special revelation is the most prominent form of revelation. Some even suggest that it is the only type
that exists. But this idea of revelation fails not only because it cannot pass these two tests, but also because it
does not agree with the scriptural witness, Ogden claims. To him, the scriptural witness says that original
revelation is as important as special revelation.

If this is the case, in what sense is special revelation

necessary? According to Ogden, the different understandings of special revelation set forth by scholars from
various traditions could not adequately prove that special revelation is new.

In place of these, Ogden insists

that his idea of special revelation as an objectification of original revelation is adequate. One defense of this
claim is that only his view agrees with the apostolic witness. For Ogden, the apostolic witness gives us an
adequate picture of Jesus as proclaimer. That is, Jesus does not reveal anything new in his revelation since
every man already has what Jesus objectifies.
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FORD: INTRODUCTION
Lewis Ford works under a metaphysical system that requires four points which are necessary for
our discussion: (1) Perfect being is not immutable; (2) Not all properties of God are necessary; (3) The
Divine nature cannot exclude all contingency; (4) Creature1y freedom requires an open future. That is,
God's knowledge is dependent on what happens in the world. However, God has a necessary side as
well. We can only know of this side of God by way of metaphysics. Rational religion, in order to be
understandable, must be built on ordinary metaphysics. This leads us to the concept of general revelation
since it can account for God's necessary action vis-a-vis all creatures. Without general revelation, we
cannot understand how God provides lures towards which the world can aspire. God's revelation does
not extend solely to our human situation, for that would mean that the revelation addressed to humanity is
the only possible type of revelation. It is not.
General Revelation
The general revelation of God through divine persuasion is not limited to the contingent human
species.

"It extends to the entire created order, and constitutes the means whereby God directs the

evolutionary process, both here and on distant planets. It addresses both subhuman creatures and extraterrestrial intelligent species, each after its own kind.,,97
Here, Ford maintains, we need to make a distinction between the Logos and the creative Word. The
Logos is described as the totality of divine aims; 98 it ranges from the largest to the smallest, the relevant to the
irrelevant ordinary aims. The creative Word is interpreted as "those aims capable of addressing an entire
species by infusing in them a novel order bringing about the emergence of a more advanced species.,,99 That
creative Word, specifically addressed to humanity, is the Christ. Thus, the creative Word must be interpreted,

97 Lewis S. Ford, The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism (philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 100.
98 Ford says that the Logos is "noncompetitive," "providing for the structure and order of the world .... " The Logos
must be recognized as a divine speaker which evokes creaturely response and must be seen as a "necessary factor in the
creative process," though "it need not be the one sufficient cause." Lewis S. Ford, Evangelical Appraisals of Process
Theism, Christian Scholar Review, p. 153.
991bid.
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of course, as only that part of the Logos which addresses a specific species; which is to say theologically,
Christ is the creative Word addressed to humankind.
Ford follows Whitehead's idea that "events and activities are primary, while enduring substantial
personhood is derivative."lOo He writes, ''No concrete, actual event, moreover, can be understood as either
wholly the work of God or the work of man (or any other creature),,,101 for each event demands an aim
provided by God to be realized as well as its own power to actualize such an aim. He further writes,
Without God there would be simply chaos, for individual occasion would
lack any ordering principle to initiate its process of integration, but without
the world, God's aims for the world would never be realized, which can be
effective only so far as it elicits concrete response.102
Hence, an individual occasion requires two103 types of power. 104 They are the persuasive power of God
and the occasion's own power, or creaturely power. Therefore, persuasion "entails response, not
conformation, and the response is free either to embrace or to reject the novel aim.,,105
Though the level of response varies in each creature, response is greatly needed on all levels.
Through the response of each creature, evolutionary advance is made possible. Hence, there must be some
type of response in each event, however minute. Ford explains,
Yet if there is to be any emergence of greater complexity, then there must
be at least a modicum of spontaneous response possible even on the atomic
and molecular levels, occasionally permitting the actualization of some
evolutionary advance. Divine persuasion is the urge to maximize the
possibilities inherent in such indeterminate response. 106
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This, Ford contends, is a form of Neo-Lamarkianism, since each creature through inheritance acquires some
type of characteristic "which is then transmitted by means of efficient causality to subsequent generations.,,107
This idea further shapes Ford's conception of general revelation. He states, "insofar as God has an eternal,
permanent essence, this is exemplified in every reaction where there is an adequate response to God. This is
the character of God's general revelation, and is fully accessible to metaphysical investigation."lo8
Thus, creaturely response in conjunction with the appropriation of novel aims from God on all levels
becomes "the chief means whereby divine purposes become effective in the world.,,109 Ford quickly points
out, however, that divine persuasion is opportunistic, not coercive in that "there is no necessity that every
creature must embody the maximum of its potentialities."llo He maintains that "whatever happens, happens
as the result of the creature's self-activity in utilizing its casual conditions to achieve its ends, but God is
everywhere and at all times seeking that which is best, given the circumstances."lll He concludes, "Such
gracious activity will not always be thwarted, so that evolutionary advance as actualized through free
creaturely response, gradually comes into being."ll2 Through general revelation, God supplies the impetus
toward complexity. Hence, God is not an efficient cause. God is the one seeking the best, given the
circumstances. When efficient causes, an aim from God, and the possibilities inside of free response are
consistent, God can now guarantee that the "complexed" will come from the simple. 113 Free response and an
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108 Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, p. 19. To Whitehead, "the things that endure are series of these occasions of
experience. Electrons, molecules, and cells are examples of such enduring things. Likewise the human soul, or stream of
experience, is composed of a series of distinct occasions of experience." Also, Ford, The Lure of God, 54.
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aim from God become efficient causes for another free response.

God uses these efficient causesl14 to

introduce divine purposes, and these purposes become effective in the world.
General revelation is the event whereby God freshly and continuously speaks in creation to each of
his creatures, so that each creature brings forth the best that is within its particular situation. This event
illuminates the dynamic character of the Word, the Logos. This word is spoken in creation to human and
subhuman hearers alike, addresses us now, and for the same purpose, ''which is the evocation of ever
increasing fulfillment of creature1y possibility.,,115 Ford writes, "That Word spoken in the creation of the
natural order also brought Israel into existence and that Word incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth becomes the
means whereby the church, the body of Christ, was created.,,116
To Ford, Israel was not only aware of the divine actions of the Logos in its own creation but also it
was cognizant of the Logos as the same effective power which shaped the natural order. ll7 Moreover, he
maintains, if we examine the creation of Israel in the context of the Exodus event, we can see not only the
"intervening power of Yahweh" but also the Logos as the divine word that calls forth the Israelites'
obedience. He explains,
The covenant between Yahweh and Israel clearly symbolized the reciprocal
character of effective response. Israel's emergence and continued existence
depended upon the conjoint presence of the divine Word and its own
faithfulness to that Word, and this may serve as the paradigm for
understanding creation. 118
"The history of God's dealing with Israel can no longer serve as the all-embracing horizon for our
understanding of God, which must now be correlated with a greatly expanded world history, a scientific
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understanding of nature and man, and a drastically altered social and ethical situation.,,1l9 Only Process
Theism, then, can provide a sufficient context for understanding God's activity since only it can do justice to
these demands, without losing Israe1's witness. Taken alone, Israel as a context is too restrictive, since it only
deals with God's involvement with humanity. But, to Ford, humanity is only one particular species since he
propounds a belief that there may be Christ events on other planets. 120 The Hebrew Bible, according to Ford,
shows that coercion cannot be found in divine action. God's power must interact with His people. Ford states
that our understanding of God cannot be based on one context, however; other traditions and contexts will
follow Israel, so we need a way to correlate them all. One way to correlate all of these contexts is to conceive
of God's activity primarily in terms of persuasion. To speak of God's activity in tenns of persuasion does two
things. First, it shows that creation without control is credible. Second, it enlarges the idea of freedom,
acknowledging that all creatures have some degree of freedom. We are, at the moment, concerned with such
broadly construed freedom, the implication of which is that God's dialogue is not limited to man but is
manifest in the entire evolutionary process. But, in order for God to address and experience all creatures, He
must have both necessary and contingent features, according to Ford.
Philosophy is recognized as the proper domain for exploring the necessary aspects of God. But
philosophy cannot do justice to His contingent dimension. Thus it needs a complement. Ford suggests that
the Bible can do justice to explaining God's contingent aspects.12l Even though the particularities122 in the
Bible are recognized as an "embarrassment" to universality, Scripture still can be recognized as the "primary
source for man's involvement with God in history.,,123

He writes, "The radical contingency of this

119

Ford, The Lure of God, 23.

120

Ibid., 16, and Ford, "Evangelical Appraisals to Process Theism," p. 155.

121

Ibid., 123

122 Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 35-36. Religious truths "which are explication of universal aspects of experience
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involvement, !mown to us through the scriptures, thus precisely complements the abstract conceptuality
process theism offers, while this conceptuality in tum illumines the way in which we today can appropriate
this rich heritage.,,124
Thus, if Scripture is actually contingent history,125 we must, somehow, account for man's "free
response," he suggests, which "in tum undercuts the traditional assumption that God controls the future (or at
least !mows it in detail), and has everything planned OUt.,,126 God is "the power of the future operative in the
present, providing possibilities which, if fully actualized in our creaturely response, will bring about the
achievement of the goOd.,,127 "This is the power of divine lure, expressed in the vision of the future reigning
of God.,,128
This divine lure was heightened in the event of Jesus, for his life, death, and resurrection gave rise to
a new plane of creation in reality, a transhuman community, defined as the body of Christ. By Christ we do
not mean the Logos, for the Logos is recognized as the totality of divine aims. Rather, Christ is that part of
the creative Word addressed to man. Ford defmes this contingent address as the emergent body of Christ,
which can only be uncovered through historical recital (revelation). Let us examine Ford's usage of biblical
tradition and process theism as these relate to the history of God's activity in Jesus and the Logos, as
presented in John's gospel.
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--The fourth gospel errs, according to Ford, when it identifies Jesus 129 as the "second member of the
Trinity" since "there cannot be distinct subjectivities within the Godhead."130 Ford maintains that, according
to Whitehead, whatever has actual unity enjoys its own subjectivity. Separate subjectivities would be separate
actualities, and vice versa.

Hence, "a divine person enjoying his own SUbjectivity would be a separate

actuality, thus leading to tritheism.,,131 If there are three persons in the Godhead, then each person would have
his own body. That is, Jesus and the Holy Spirit would be persons with their own bodies, similar to the
Father. This is a necessary conclusion for process theism but not for historical Christianity, which maintains
that God is Spirit, and thus He does not possess a body. Moreover, he writes, "Substance in the sense of
divine substratum in which three persons inhere is just that sort of vacuous actuality devoid of its own
subjectivity that Whitehead rejects.,,132

Thus, Ford rejects the Latin interpretation of the Trinity:

"one

substance in three persons," and accepts the Greek version: "one actuality having three distinct aspects.,,133
Ford says that a "person" is not an individual substratum but a specific role that someone plays. He explains,
in terms of Duns Scotus, "These natures are formally distinct. They are not really distinct, for this would
imply the possibility of separate existence nor are they merely logically distinct.,,134 Whereas tritheism leads
to three gods with their own bodies, the idea of three sharing the same body is also inaccurate to Ford.
Therefore, he opts for a Greek version of modalism. But historic Christianity's interpretation of the trinity
does not imply or even suggest that the three members share a body. For traditional Christianity, a body is not

129 Jesus cannot be the Logos for two reasons. First, the Logos is a "timeless principle of order and purpose in the universe."
Second, process theism sees deity as a substance which cannot merge with humanity as a substance. Process Theology, ed.
R.H. Nash (Baker, 1987), pp. 66 and 67. Thus, process theology interprets the idea of God-man savior or the Incarnation as
the immanence of God in Jesus. William N. Pittenger, Catholic Faith in a Process Perspective (Mary Knoll, New York: Orbis,
1981), p. 95.
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a necessary requirement for personhood. The three persons are distinct, though they have the same nature.
But nature should not be interpreted as something material, like a body.

In summation, Ford believes that the Christian idea of the trinity ultimately leads to tritheism, and,
thus, he rejects the idea of three persons in one substance. However, he admits that his alternative (one
actuality, different aspects) leads to Arianism, something he tries to correct in a later work. For Arianism
would make two subjectivities relative to God and Christ. 135 He tries to solve this dilemma by presenting
the idea of mutual transformation of Jesus and GOd.136 That is, without Jesus, God cannot become the
Christ; without God, Jesus cannot become the ChriSt. 137 This idea supposedly keeps his theory from
collapsing into Arianism since Jesus is absorbed l38 into God and God is experienced by Jesus. This
mutual transformation does not allow Jesus to be transhuman. 139 This brings us to the matter of Christ. 140
Ford insists that Christ has subjectivity but only in the event of his resurrection/ 41 not as a preexistent subject. He enjoys subjectivity as "that transparent medium which most intensely communicates
God's aim to the Christian.,,142 Ford believes that "humanity is a contingent species, which need never have
135 Ford maintains that "Christ is the visible image of God." God as the Father is also an image of God. Ford, unpublished
article, "Christ as the Mutual Transfonnation of God and Jesus," p. 4.
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137 "Christ" denotes the transfonnation of both God and Jesus, having both as necessary constituents. Ford, "Christ as the
Mutual Transfonnation of God and Jesus," p. 8.
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Jesus' life and death affects God. Ibid., p. 3.

139 Christ and the God of Israel are "equally images of God." Also, they are "salvific images for their respective
communities." Ibid. p. 7.
140 Ford's idea of Christ is elaborated in the work, "Christ as the Mutual Transfonnation of God and Jesus." Both this article
and The Lure of God "stress the role of the risen Christ as key to New Testament thought," both "appreciate the importance
oftemporal transfonnation," and both go behind "the reported visions ofthe risen Christ to the imperceptible reality these refer
to." Ford, "Christ as the Mutual Transfonnation of God and Jesus," p. 10. However, The Lure of God sees the risen Christ
as an inner SUbjectivity, the dynamic coordinating agency ofthe body of Christ. His body is a "new evolutionary emergence
of which Christians constitutes its members," p 10. This is Arianism. The Lure of God, p. 95. Also, The Lure of God
represents God and Christ as two distinct subjectivities. Christ is neither divine or human. He is a transhuman creature. This
new article corrects the Arian solution "by merging the two subjectivities of God and Christ into one." Thus, he (Ford)
accounts for the "temporal emergence of Christ as the mutual transfonnation of both God and Jesus," p. 10.
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existed. If so, the special character of God's salvific action on man's behalf must also be contingent.,,143 Thus
theology has its own domain; that is, it must determine God's specific revelation to humankind. As humans,
we "are concerned with the specific way that loving response is directed toward us in our own particular
existential predicament."l44 This can only be revealed in contingent historical particularities. 145 This idea is
further enhanced if we view Christology in a broader context. To Ford, "Christology must be placed in the
context of possible intelligent life elsewhere in the universe.,,146 To do this, then, is to interpret the Christ as
that part of the creative Word which is specifically addressed to humanity. Thus in Christ God has not only
become incarnate as human but also for humanity.147 Therefore, only through a christological aim, or God's
purpose in Christ, can we evolve beyond ourselves in the form of a new unity, the church. To Christians, this
ain1 was realized in Jesus of Nazareth through his life, death, and resurrection. 148
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CHRISTOLOGIAL REVELATION
According to Ford, antecedent conditions are important since they direct the aims given in any
situation. That which distinguishes Jesus from other holy men is the aim that he receives. For these aims are
specifically christological. Christ-events should not be classified as primal achievements (Ford's term is

optimal realization) but "as one particular species of human events characterized by the successful
achievement of 'christological aims,' as yet unspecified as to content.,,149

He writes, "Complete human

response to the divine prompting may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the Christ-event if we
defme such response in relative rather that absolute terms.,,150 He assumes that there is an unmistakable
difference between christological aims and ordinary divine aims. The realization of ordinary aims or primal
achievements is necessary for Christ-events, though not in any primary sense, since total obedience is only a
partial requisite for Christ-events. Christ-events can only be achieved if God, in his goodness, grants to the
situation christological aims. So Christ-events are not judged by compliance with divine aims only but, also
by the presentation of christo logical aims by the grace of God. Even though this is not an arbitrary act of
God, still, not everyone can receive christological aims, for "christological aims depend upon the grace of
God, and He bestows them on some and not on others.,,151 The acts of God can be effective only so far as
they elicit concrete response. Only a full creaturely response reveals God's action in the world. Jesus was
fully responsive, but this is only a general achievement and thus is not enough to make him the Christ. All
situations have antecedent conditions. These antecedent conditions can be ordinary, special, or particularly
special. The christological aims that God bestows upon Jesus can be identified by the particular antecendent
conditions (God's address to humanity) within his aims.
Many process theologians have made the mistake of awarding specialness to Jesus on the merit of his
realization of ideal aims. But as Griffm points out, and Ford to this extent agrees, they do not make sufficient
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use of the belief that ideal aims can be intensified, which is a consistent Whiteheadian concept. Griffm
proposes that Jesus received christiological aims. Jesus actualized these aims for the entire creation. 152 But
Griffm errs according to Ford, since he neglects a third factor: "the contingent dimension of God's personal
relationship to the human situation.,,153
The Christ as Revelation

God is personal, and he has a contingent nature. 154 This nature is "revealed in the contingencies of his
particular dealings with his creatures."155

Whereas his eternal, necessary nature, along with his general

revelation, can be accessed by means of an adequate philosophy, his personal nature, special revelation, can
thus be seen only through historical disclosure. 156 Since God is related to humanity, and since humanity is a
contingent species,157 the special character of his revelation must be contingent and open-ended. 158 Therefore,
special revelation has a different subject matter from general revelation.

Only special revelation, Ford

maintains, can tell us "what God is like for US.,,159
Christ is a life-giving spirit. Thus the actions of the church "are animated and directed by the lifegiving spirit of the last Adam, that man who stands in the threshold of a new emergent reality, the body of
ChriSt."I60 "This body here and now is composed of many human members, of flesh and blood, but it is a
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154 Ford maintains that God is active receptivity; He (God) can be further enriched by the world. Lewis S. Ford,
"Christ as the Mutual Transfonnation of God and Jesus," p. 42.
155 Ibid., 52. Events can be different; God's experience of such an event must be contingent. Ford, "Evangelical Appraisals
to Process Theism," p. 152.
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spiritual body because it is animated by the spirit of ChriSt.,,161 The church "forms a living organism, a
biological phenomenon which we conceive to be the next stage in the emergent evolution of the world, and
the incarnation of the divine Word.,,162 For the "concrete character of the creative Word must be found in the
specific way in which it addresses each species beyond itself.,,163 Thus, he explains, "God's purposes in
Christ are not merely to manifest his love to all mankind (though it intends that as well), but to establish a new
organic unity transcending human fragenentariness.,,164
The body of Christ (the church) is a particular stage in the emergent evolution of the world in a
subjective sense. From an objective standpoint, the body of Christ is an incarnation of the Creative Word.
The Creative Word embodies the Logos but it has its own concrete character which can be found in the
particular way it addresses a species. Christ, as the Last Adam, is the fmal cause of the spiritual body,
according to Ford.
Revelation and Divine Sovereignty
Jesus does believe that God's kingdom is here and does share in the idea of a future coming of God
as his Kingdom. But he "does not seek to explain why God's kingdom has been delayed so long, for he was
grasped by its immediacy.,,165

Truly, he believes in God's coming as Jeremias points out: ''Nowhere in the

message of Jesus does the basileia (kingdom) denote the lasting reign of God over Israel in this age.,,166 But
he (Jesus) "refused to speculate concerning the signs of the end that must be fulf1lled.,,167

161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid., 74.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus (New York: Schribner, 1971), 101-102, cited
in Ford, The Lure of God, 33.
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The special revelation of Jesus equates not his life and death as instrumental to the resurrection of
Christ. Jesus speaks of the "present immediacy of this future kingdom, for this future reality exerted its power
upon present actions."168 "The kingdom of God," however, "in Jesus' preaching cannot be interpreted as either
simply future or simply present: recent New Testament scholarship has abundantly shown this."169
Jesus proclaimed: 'the kingdom of God has come near,'170 which means
more than simply that is was expected to arrive some not too distant date in
the future. Its nearness is also a qualitative measure of its power in affecting
the present, a power which has already come to be felt. This future reality
exerts its own power, more or less felt in varying degrees of nearness or
distance. As this nearness was experienced in all of its power and
poignancy, it was natural to assume, given the apocalyptic expectations of
the day, that the long awaited kingdom of God was also chronologically
near as well. But the experienced nearness of the kingdom may be
independent of its chronological date, since it implies directly only to the
power which the future exerts in the present. l7l
Ford would have us to believe that Jesus introduces the power of the present as past content to be actualized
by an occasion. Also, he thinks Jesus realized that the power of the present brings in both the future (fmal
causes) and the past (efficient causes) as past content.
Whitehead conceived of actuality as producing itself out of its own antecendent causes. Jesus was
active by way of His own power in the form of his Christological aims. These aims were determined by His
past causes (the Kingdom of God as power which has already come to be felt) since the content
(Christological aims) was appropriated and unified by Jesus. To Ford, productive activity must be found in
the present event, which has its own power.
Jesus' present brings in both the past and the future. This is the case only if his Christological aims
have two aspects. The SUbjective aspect is his power of the present (innermost subjectivity), and the objective

168 Ford, The Lure of God, 33.
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aspect is the past content addressed to his present. Likewise, this power affects us as individualized men in
the form of God's general purposes. Ford writes:
This proclamation is also coupled with a summons to repentance and faith.
The power of this nearness does not affect us indifferently, shunting us to
and fro in the manner of a physical force acting in terms of efficient
causation. This power addresses our freedom, eliciting a response of
acceptance or hostility. Its power lies precisely in its capacity to call forth
our freedom, for it stir us to our very depths. The possibilities of repentance
and faith require the fullest exercise of freedom, as they involve the
transformation of our own selfhood. l72
A special act (or God's kingdom) involves a future reality and a present reality. The special revelation of
Jesus Christ is not a present reality which vindicates God's general revelation, but must be taken as something
which actualizes a new possibility. "The power of the future does not reside in some future actuality. This is
a contradiction in terms if, in our freedom, we face a genuinely open future, such that nothing is actual until it
has been actualized in the present.,,173 In addition, "it is not as if this awaited actuality first exerts power when
it becomes actual in the present.,,174 Future actuality equals a real possibility. If the divine activity (power of
the future) resides in Jesus' innermost subjectivity, then the divine power would be Jesus' SUbjectivity or the
power of the past (Christological aims). But the divine activity (power of the future) must be interpreted as a
pure possibility, not as a real possibility.
Jesus teaches that a special act (or God's kingdom) shows how a revelation can be effective in a
present reality or past; even though he never equates the two. Ford writes, "To understand the power of God,
then we must focus our attention on how the future can be effective in the present. It is precisely on this point
that Jesus' teaching is liberating, for it portrays this future kingdom as it impinges upon the present.,,175 A
special act is not a hypostatic union of a present reality and a future inert possibility. Rather, it requires the
potential revelatory act and the revelation of response. Ford maintains that:
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Both dimensions are cmcial. If the kingdom is simply a present reality, then
it is just one more actuality among others in our present world, mysteriously
hidden from view. If the kingdom is simply future, then it exerts no power
to which the present must respond, but remains merely an inert possibility
we hope someday might be realized. It is the energizing of possibilities by
divine appetition that constituted the power of the future in the present, the
nearness of God's reign.176
The life and teaching of Jesus is needed to actualize the power of God. 177 "By using the term 'kingdom of
God,' with its indelible future orientation, however, Jesus implies that God's power is this power of the future,
for it is this future reigning of God which is actualized in the present by means of this ministry of
exorcism.'m8 Ford's illustration of the exorcism of Jesus against Beelzebub is proof that God is the power of
the future. However, God is not a sole agent that affects all things. We must account for the power of the
present, future, and past. Straight forward apocalyptic hope is an idle act. God's activity is in Jesus as a
present. This means that His activity can never become present but must remain future.
The Father begets the Son or Logos. Special revelation must now express the idea that Christ is an
embodiment of the Logos as a result of the life and death ofJesus.179 This must be so, for if the "kingdom of
God were to become a present reality, it would no longer be future. Thus the reigning of God is forever,
future, never capable of surrendering its futurity to present realization.',18o
Jesus' death now becomes the vehicle for sending Christ. His death now allows the Logos to be fully
effective to humanity. "Through Jesus' faithful response to the Father, His human activity became the vehicle
for divine power of the future to be fully effective."181 Ford clearly adheres to the belief that
God's judgement takes place through the instmmentality of this world, but
the consummation of the kingdom we long for must be an unambiguously
divine event. For that very reason it cannot be a future event, as every event
176
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in this temporal world requires the conjoint activity of both God and
creatures. Our irreducible freedom, moreover, means that we fmally
determine, through our own present power, how effective God's future
power will be. 182
We should look for the consummation of the Kingdom in the divine activity rather than in the
christological aims given to Jesus. In those aims, God affects the world. In the divine activity addressed to
humanity, the world affects God as a fmal cause.
God is not a future actuality. Rather, he is a non-temporal actuality whose presence is felt through the
future. That is, the subjective aspect of God cannot be felt. Only his objective manifestation can be felt. In
our case, this must be taken as contingent. Therefore, the ideals (God's presence, power) used to bring the
actuality (the past) experienced by God (the present) in harmonious unity (the future) thereby become lures
for actualization in the temporal world.
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JESUS CHRIST AS RESPONSE AND REVELATION
God's love is not absolute in its relativity, but rather in its integrity. "God's love is absolute in its
integrity, invulnerable to any destruction, but this by no means implies any impassability to suffering, which
is at the heart of the most profound love. 183 If God does not suffer, then His love or revelation in Christ is not
dependent upon the death of Jesus.
experiences.

Thus, His love is something which is separated from our human

However, we know, according to Ford, that God must work in union with his creatures. In

order to understand this profound thought, we must elaborate for a moment on God's primordial nature.
In his primordial nature, God provides each occasion with lures. "The primordial nature is the source

of all those possible ideals which can serve as the initial aim of occasions,"184 Ford explains. Following
Whitehead, Ford maintains that transcendence is a generic notion in that it applies to all creatures, even to
God:

"Such transcendence is possible only because of the incessant

creative urge transforming every

multiplicity as it arises into an actual unity."185 All actual entities, including God, are creatures which share in
the characteristic of transcendence.
God "transcends and is transcended in ways peculiar to Him."186 That is, whereas the transcendence
of a fInite actual entity is relative, God's transcendence is absolute, since He can transcend "every actual entity
as it arises by incorporating it into His being.,,187 However, fInite entities are also in a sense absolute in that
they are transcended by other subsequent entities. God, though, is only "partially transcended by actual
occasions, for they can only pretend those aims of God relevant to their particular world, leaving untouched
those infInite reservoirs of possibility which are not yet (or no longer relevant) to the creative advance."188
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God is pure presence, eternal to Himself, a non-temporal actuality who, as the envisagement of
infInitude of all real possibilities, requires a past from the world to create a new future, transforming His
possibilities to persuasive lures.
This non-temporal, primordial nature of God is ultimacy in its religious meaning. It is distinct from
the metaphysical ultimacy, creativity.

For, metaphysically, creativity requires two "instanations:" the

creativity of God and the creativity of fInite occasions. Both are necessary since "sheer creativity is utterly
formless.,,189 Creativity cannot determine primordial envisagement. Ford writes,
God is an accident of creativity because the particular character of the
primordial envisagement is not determined by the essential nature of
creativity. Creativity only requires that the many become one, but how they
become one is the decision of that actuality in process of self-creation. 190
Thus, the world in which "God creates in creating himself' is "the infInite wealth of structured possibility
which constitutes God's primordial nature.,,191
God's revelation in Jesus Christ is intelligible, and it can communicate his love to mankind, but only
with relation to the life and death of Jesus as a response in his present to God's christological aims. Jesus'
death is needed to show God's reconciliation and renewal of revelation to humanity as a contingent species.
In response to Jesus' activity, God sends, through or by means of the resurrection, the Christ.

Given our understanding of the way God acts in cooperative union with his
creatures, we cannot see the resurrection as a unilateral action of God. On
the one hand, raising Jesus to himself cannot simply be a purely arbitrary
decision of God's part, but one made in response to the intrinsic quality of
Jesus' life, suffering, and death. He is the one most worthy to be praised,
because the living purpose of Jesus concretely embodied God's own
purpose for mankind. l92
He continues,
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--Were any other person with a narrower outlook or sympathies raised up as
the living source of aims to which we humans would be subordinate, we
could find ourselves subject to a demonic totalitarianism destructive of the
best possibilities inherent is us as separate individuals. 193
God's revelation in Christ must come by a response to the death of Jesus. Ford maintains that:
A risen Christ to whom we can subordinate ourselves in good conscience
must be one whom to serve is perfect freedom. Jesus can become that risen
Christ only because his living purpose fulfills and does not thwart our
highest aims. On the other hand, the resurrection of the body of Christ also
involves the transformation of individual men into willing members of that
body, and this can only be effected through the atonement. 194
God was able to raise Jesus because his life embodied the divine activity. Thus, God's purposes to us as
individual men are appropriate.

If these purposes were not appropriate, then we could not have the

atonement. As humans, we look for richer resources and higher aims in God's purposes, according to Ford.
As individuals, we need to place our faith in such purposes. This allows us to become members in the body
of Christ.
The Revelation of Jesus Christ As Relative to the Resurrection
The revelation of Jesus Christ is largely, though not entirely, dependent upon the action of Jesus. It
also requires the revelation in Christ, which is identified with the successful realization of christological
aims. 195
To Ford, the risen Christ is living but not perceptible. He is that dynamic personality who assured
the early Christians that He was still alive among them. He cites Knox's contention that: "The two facts--he
was known still and he was remembered--constitute together the miracle of the Resurrection; and neither is
more important than the other."I96
Both the granting of the christological aim and its receptive realization
required prior preparation. To be relevant and usefully significant, God's
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particular purpose must be realizable under the existent conditions only
permit meager results. In other circumstances the concrete realizations of
God's preliminary aims may create the conditions for a further
intensification of divine aim. 197
God's particular purpose was given to Israel since mankind as a whole failed to actualize it. Israel, as well as
the small faithful remnant, failed also. Though they all (mankind, Israel, the remnant) failed to actualize his
aim, they established the condition for Jesus to arrive and actualize God's purpose. When Jesus died, He
became an efficient cause. His death allowed the Christ to come, according to Ford. He maintains that the
early Christians experienced Christ in visions.
That is, the revelation in Jesus must bear a continuity with the Spirit of Christ. "The Spirit of Christ
must have had its own distinctive personality, for they recognized that it bore unmistakable continuity with
their master Jesus whom they remembered.,,198
He denies the historic Christian viewpoint that Jesus was resurrected bodily from the dead. He
replaces this idea with the concept of apostolic reports and apostolic resurrection appearances. Thus, the
church's experience of Christ is a real possibility only if we take these reports to be efficient cause of the
experience of Christ, and take the appearances to a pure possibility or final cause of Christ's resurrection.

The Revelation of Jesus Christ as Relative to the Cross
Jesus is not the re-presentation of Christ. Jesus becomes the Christ because his living purpose incarnates
God's purpose for us. The death of Jesus overcomes sin so that we can receive the love GOd. 199 Williams
writes that "the insight that the reconciliation which creates the new community comes by way of suffering.
Jesus' suffering becomes the very word and speech oflove finding bodily, historical expression and creating a
new possibility of community. 200
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God's revelation must be understood as possible only in conjunction with the atonement of Jesus.
The revelatory act as found in Jesus' death is responsible for the actualization of God's gracious revelation of
love to us. "Without atonement, therefore, the resurrection of Christ would not have been possible--for there
would be no individual human beings capable of being transformed into members of that body.,,20! The
responsive act of Jesus has "inaugurated a process of reconciliation which continues its work of concretely
exhibiting to us the love of God in the body of Christ's resurrection.,,202
Jesus does not show us that all history is redeemed.

He reveals, according to Ford, that our

redemption lies in his life and death along with the resurrection of Christ. Ford maintains that our redemption
"is found not only in the assurance that our inacceptability is accepted, but that the evil inherent therein is
transformed into lasting value, a good we can dimly appreciate.,,203 We are accepted on the basis that we
place our faith in God's ability to give richer resources and higher aims. God responds to this trust by giving
us peace -- assurance that he has felt our evil in consequent nature. This is so for Ford because he believes
that God has a consequent nature.

Some background information must be given concerning God's

consequent nature because Ford's methodology calls for the world to be related to God as well as God to the
world.
Ford follows Whitehead's belief that actual entities have two poles. These two poles are conceptual
and physical prehensions.

Moreover, God is also an actual entity, and thus He is no exception to this

category.204 "Without these additional physical prehensions, God would have no experience of the world,
whose plurality and fInitude require temporality.,,205 But "the experiential evidence for the divine consequent

201 Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 184 as quoted in Ford op.
cit., 90.
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nature is very subtle and tenuous.,,206 Since any proof for God's consequent nature is unsubstantial--at least to
Whitehead, since he is interested only in necessary or generic features--then we cannot "directly apprehend
his consequent nature, but become aware of its presence by the subtle, dynamic shifts in the divine aims
directly accessible to us as God's response to our actions.,,207 Not only do we become aware of dynamic shifts
in initial aims, but these can also redeem. He writes that:
The individual, momentary occasions of our life, with their particular,
limited accomplishments, pass away, yet not before they are caught up and
transformed in the divine life, informing and qualifying those initial aims
which God then supplies our successive occasions. These new aims are not
impervious to our past, but express God's living response and
encouragement to our faltering actions. 208
Hence, "we are being born anew from above as we receive novel aims from God originating our
sUbjectivity from moment to moment."Z09 This thought is verified by the biblical command of the apostle
John: "You must be born anew." (italics are Ford's). "It is God's consequent experience of our lives which
calls forth his dynamic provision of new aims for our lives, by which we have redemption.,,210
Ancient Israel was aware of God's personal involvement, and it foresaw the Whiteheadian concept of
God's consequent and temporal nature, according to Ford. Yet, Ford fUlther points out that "an idea of
rejection through sin soon arose within Israel's view of God as a righteous judge.,,2l1 To this threat of
rejection, however, the New Testament assures us that God will accept all the evil in the world into his being,

206 Divine relativity "includes a sympathetic feeling with the worldly beings, all of whom have feelings. Hence, it is not
merely the content of God's knowledge which is dependent, but God's own emotional state. God enjoys our enjoyments, and
suffers with our sufferings. This is the kind of responsiveness which is truly divine and belongs to the very nature of
perfection. Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 48.
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and transform it. This admittance of evil into God's being is expressed as divine suffering through the cross.
That is, divine suffering can be summarized by the event of the crucifIxion. 212
The potential revelation of Jesus' sacrifIcial life and death does not vindicate, for Ford, God's
revelation in Christ; rather, his death reveals the temporary weakness of God.
In the hour of Jesus' deepest need, he could not feel the presence of God,
because there were no redemptive possibilities that God could provide, no
aims which could vouchsafe to him the infInite resourcefulness of the life in
clothing his actions with resplendent meaning, sending him forth with
renewed courage. For Jesus, there was only the cross and death. In his
cross the weakness of god is revealed, as he stood by powerless to comfort
his beloved. The worst of it was that God intimately experienced Jesus'
awareness that this sustaining grace had suddenly abandoned Jesus, but he
knew this abandonment, as Jesus knew it, in the depths of his being.213

Our salvation must be grounded in not only the abandonment of God as seen in the death of Jesus,
but also in our present response to the renewed revelation of God's gracious act in Christ, as displayed in His
resurrection.

Ford writes, "Thus the very act in which Jesus felt abandonment in his death enabled the

emergence of the lure for resurrection in the near future.,,214 He concludes, "In this transhuman body we need
no longer fear abandonment of God in death, for even that can contribute to ongoing life. Jesus underwent the
abandonment of God, so necessary for the emergence of the resurrected body, in order that we might be
spared his experience.,,215
The renewed life which is found in Christ must be grounded solely in the primordial nature of God in
order to be a new possibility addressed to the human situation.

The resurrected Christ's subjectivity is

temporally emergent, yet the objective principle that he embodies relative to our need is grounded in the very
fabric of the transcendent, primordial God.,,216
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SUMMARY OF FORD
For Lewis Ford, God as di-polar has necessary and contingent aspects. He asserts that the necessary
aspects can be known only through philosophy, and that contingent aspects can be revealed through scriptures
as a history of God's dealing with humanity.
We can see, then, that God acts in general toward all creatures as the Logos. The tenn "divine
persuasion," however, is a way to describe this action to humanity. God's action is not limited to humanity
but must extend to all creatures. This is so because Ford makes a distinction between the Logos and the
creative word. The creative word addressed to us is the Christ. But we could not receive the Christ as
humans until the divine lure was heightened in the event of Jesus, Ford maintains. Christological aims, he
says, were needed to allow Jesus to become the vehicle for God sending the Christ to us. Humanity was then
taken to be the next step in an evolutionary process which allows Christology to be placed in the context of
life on other planets. The achievement of Christ events led to the belief that Christ is a life-giving spirit, and
that the death of Jesus allows the Christ to come. For Ford, this event can only take place if God can suffer as
the glorification of Christ, and if God accepts individuals who are willing to be transfonned into the body of
Christ. The church is the body of Christ, animated by Christ himself.
In conclusion, God's revelation starts with a general address to all creatures and ends in an
idea of revelation addressed to contingent creatures on other planets.
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A CONCLUDING COMPARISON OF OGDEN AND FORD
Both Ogden and Ford believe that God acts in an original or general way relative to all creatures.
However, Ford maintains that God has acted in Israel differently from the way he acts in other nations. To
Ford, past circumstances played an important role in the specialness of Jesus. But Ogden maintains that God
acts primordally in Jesus the same way he acts in all creatures.
David Griffm criticizes Ogden's idea of Jesus' specialness by pointing out the contradiction inherent
to such a statement. Griffm states that Ogden has made it impossible to state that Jesus is special, and doubly
impossible for hin1 to be decisive. Griffin insists that Jesus could not be special without God's acting some
way different in Israel as well as in Jesus. He goes on to introduce his idea of christological aims which
accounts for the specialness of Jesus.217
Ford follows Griffm's line of reason relative to christological aims, but he maintains that Griffm is
mistaken by asserting that Jesus actualized God's aim for the entire creation. Ford would have us to believe
God made two prior attempts to have humanity actualize its specific purpose. God addressed Israel as a
whole and the small, faithful remnant after the exile. Both failed to actualize God's specific purpose fully for
humanity; nonetheless, they (Israel and Israel's remnant) set the stage for Jesus. That is, God was able to
intensify his aims for Jesus through the past response ofIsrael and Israel's remnant. Jesus actualized his
ordinary aims to a high degree. This allowed God to send him christological aims. The past content (Israel
and its remnant) and Jesus' subjective aim (the presupposition of God's address through him to humanity)
make his aims different in kind from other men. Thus, for Ford, Jesus is special because he actualized God's
aim to a high degree, and he is supreme revelation because the aims he received were different in kind.
Therefore, Jesus can be seen as supreme without any supematural elements. Jesus actualized his aims to a
high degree; this allowed him to be seen as special. But other men of religious leaders, like Buddha, may
have actualized God's aims for them to a high degree. However, Jesus' aims were not sin1ply special, but
rather the past content of his aims made his aims particularly special. The idea ofthe past attached to the new
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is necessary for Ford if we categorize events into three levels. These levels are general acts, special acts, and
particularly special acts. Without past content, we cannot detennine the various kinds of events. Israel and
the remnanfl8 were factors in detennining the decisiveness of Jesus.
Ogden arrives at the specialness of Jesus from a standpoint of renewal. All men receive the same
aims, so the type of aims of a man is not considered by Ogden in detennining the specialness of an act. An
act is special for Ogden if it re-presents God's characteristic activity as Creator and Redeemer. The idea of a
special act does not lose all of its universality. That is, any man can re-present God's action. However, when
someone else interprets this event as re-presenting God's action, then it can become a special act. So, if
someone appropriately re-presents God's action and some one receives this action as God's action, then the
act becomes a decisive act of God. Since Jesus actualized God's aims to a high degree and the disciples
interpreted him as doing so, he has become a decisive act. Ogden is not interested in various kinds of aims,
i.e., christological aims. He is concerned with the various kinds of religions. For the disciples and
Christianity, Jesus can become a decisive act by re-presenting God's love to those who are a part of the
Christian tradition. Jesus does not reveal anything new as a revelation to them since every man already has
what Jesus objectifies. However, since he reveals God's love to them personally, what he reveals is
something new, as an occurrence in their history of God's love. Thus, Ogden's way around the dilemma is to
conceive of various traditions instead of various kinds of aims. To him, revelation can be new in that it
reveals God's love appropriately to specific traditions and personally to a person who is a part of that
tradition.
Both Ogden and Ford escape the dilemma of presenting something new in a system that requires all
events to be related instantations of creativity by appealing to the idea that there are other Christs besides
Jesus. Ogden feels that there can be other Christs relative to various traditions,219 whereas Ford maintains that
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there can be other Christs relative to other planets. 22o This type of thinking leads both Ogden and Ford to a
view of the resurrection of Christ as something subjective21821 rather than objective.
When dealing with Jesus and the resurrection, Ogden starts with the Apostolic witness, which is
really a future event if we compare it in time to the event of Jesus, which is ever present. Prior to the event of
Jesus was the past event of God's original revelation. Bultmann maintained that man's authentic existence
was lost in the past and must be restored by the present event of Jesus. Of course, Ogden rejects Bultmann's
teaching because man cannot lose his authentic existence, according to his system. So the role of Jesus is
simply to objectify God's original revelation. Ogden states that the Jesus behind the Apostolic witness cannot
be a past historical future.219 Rather, the event of Jesus is the present event of Jesus constitutive of and
constituted by the Apostolic witness. 22o If Jesus·is the present event, then he must presuppose the Apostolic
witness. Also, if Jesus is human, according to Ogden's existentialist interpretation, then he is the present
event addressed to me. In either case, the Resurrection of Jesus must be SUbjective because the resurrection is
not a historical happening after the life and death of Jesus. 221 This may be the New Testament's idea of
resurrection, but it must be taken strictly as mythology. That which occurs after the life and death of Jesus is
the Apostolic Witness;222 that which occurred prior to the present event of Jesus is God's original revelation.

An objective resurrection would cancel the need for the Apostolic witness. Only a SUbjective resurrection
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221 Carl E. Bratten paraphrases Rudolph Bultmann's idea of resurrection as an event that (1) did not happen in the
physical world; (2) and that the resurrection is not an event of past history. Ogden follows Bultmann's idea of
resurrection. But to the disciples and early Christians, God intervened supernaturally within history in a special way
relative to the resurrection "Christian Theism is Resunection Theism., Carl E. Bratten, in History and
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222 William G. Doty points out the fact that it is possible that Jesus did have the intention of fonnulating his sayings
for transmission. Moreover, R. T. France asserts that the disciples were concerned with preserving the truth.
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would be in line in the Apostolic witness since the Apostolic witness bears witness to the resurrection as
God's testimony.
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A CONCLUDING EVALUATION OF OGDEN AND FORD
God, The W orId, and Past Events
The idea of an infallible Word must begin with a personal God, "creating, speaking, taking counsel
within the Trinity of Divine Persons.,,223 This requires an infInite "particular Power" that can produce "word
symbols" understandable by fInite men. The key to understanding such a "particular Power" is not just his
infInity but also his personhood. The Genesis record maintains the plurality of persons (not gods) who are the
ground of our own human personhood. That is, human personhood is derivative to a personal God who
created us in his own image. He has bestowed on us fmite and communicable attributes which are not
"delusions in an impersonal universe.,,224 As stated earlier, the God of the Bible is consistent with a designed
universe, one in which He was free to create. 225 In like manner, human personhood with its ability to love and
communicate is consistent with the God of the Bible. The God who designed and created the universe is the
same God who created us in his own linage. This God, according to Scripture, is triune in personhood, and is
the sufficient reason226 for both human persons and his universe. Thus, the traditional doctrine of creation
tells us that the universe and personhood is neither unreal nor divine.227
In order to give an appropriate understanding of revelation, we must utilize three basic facts of

historic Christianity. These facts are (1) the universe was created by a self-existent God and has a fInite
beginning; (2) the God who created the world revealed himself to us in propositional form as triune, and
(3) this triune God reveals himself in both a general, natural way and a special, supernatural way.

223

Brown, Tensions in Contemporary Theology, pp. 461-62.

224

Ibid., p. 462.

225 Norman Geisler points out that Ogden makes a category mistake when he claims that a necessaty being must
necessarily create. Nonnan Geister, "Process Theology" in Tensions in Contemporary Theology, ed. Stanley N ..
Gundry and Alan J. Johnson (Chicago: Moody, 1976), p. 274.
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Process theology challenges those basic facts by maintaining that universe does not have a fmite
beginning, nor is God a trinity or tri-unity of persons. Rather, God can be interpreted as a tri-unity of
principles. Also, it propounds the idea that God can act in a general, natural way, but not in a special,
supernatural way.
Both Ogden and Ford maintain that general and special revelation can be interpreted adequately
along process lines. But it is one thing to say that revelation can be interpreted in terms of process
theology, it is another thing to claim that one's interpretation of revelation is appropriate to the meaning
of revelation as presented in Scripture, a claim that both make relative to their theories of revelation.
First, scripture claims that the universe had a beginning. But, before we look at the scriptural
evidence, we must examine the claim that the universe does not have a beginning from a process
standpoint.
Process theology upholds the belief that every act of temporal self-creation is based on past
efficient causes. This means that process theologians can maintain that time has always existed since
there can be times before any time we can specify. Therefore, they insist that the "world has always
existed in some form or other, since time and the world could not exist apart from each other.,,228
William Lane Craig points out that this belief is in line with the "Greek view of the eternity of
matter.,,229 Thus, he argues that the world's past according to process thought must be absolutely infinite.
Therefore, he critiques process thought by arguing that no infmite series can be completed in our present
since the present presupposes the completeness of its past. That is, it is impossible for an infmite series to
be actual as complete without having both a beginning and an ending. 230 But, an infinite series does not
have a beginning and an ending. Thus, the past cannot be absolutely infmite. Ford, however, challenges
Craig's assertion by stating that "no matter what past event we specify as the beginning of our series,
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however remote it may be, it can be only fmitely distant from our present.,,231 Ford's point is that there
can be various beginnings, all presupposing prior events. This would mean that "the matter out of which
present events create themselves are past events ... .'>232 But his answer to Craig leads to a greater
problem, the existence of past events as efficient causes. The idea of past events is based on the
assumption that "everything is either an actual entity that concretely exists in the world or one of the
eternal potentialities existing in the primordial nature of God.,,233 Ronald Nash points out that this
"dualism excludes anything that can serve as a sufficient reason for the existence of any actual entity.,,234
Not even the process standard answer of creativity can help. If Ford appeals to creativity to explain the
dualism that past events need, then creativity must be taken as something that exists outside the world and
as something above God. That is, creativity cannot be "a real ground in a Whiteheadian system; only
actual entities are real causes.'>235 Craig's thesis that the lmiverse has a beginning is not only logical but
also biblical. It is illogical to assume with Ford and Ogden the belief that past events are the matter from
which present events create themselves.
The World and Infinite Potentials
Traditional thought points out many inconsistencies relative to process theology. There are two
inconsistencies that plague the process concept of revelation, however.
First, process theology cannot successfully explain how some of God's infmite possibilities become
actual. Geisler writes, that "anything passing from potentiality to actuality, from what is not to what is,
depends on some actuality to ground it. Nothing does not produce something; possibilities to exist do not
materialize on their own.,,236 Ogden's concept of revelation depends upon this process premise. He holds
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that what Jesus re-presents is an actual general truth. In like fashion, Ford insists that Jesus actualized
christological aims from God. Ford would have us to believe that these aims are actual. But, there is
nothing in process theology that can substantiate this thought. This is an issue that is neglected by both
Ogden and Ford. Both assume that some of God's infmite possibilities are actual. Without this premise,
neither can maintain that the revelation is special in some sense. If God's infmite possibilities are only
potentials, as stated by Geisler, then Ogden cannot say that anyone is confronted with a real possibility
that is actually re-presented to them as historical event through Jesus; and Ford cannot maintain that
Jesus was actually transformed by God.

The World and Finite Being

Second, process theology fails to give a sufficient reason for the origin of particular events. Ogden
says that Jesus re-presents God; and, Ford avers that Jesus transforms God. However, neither gives an
account for the origin or existence of Jesus. In typical process fashion, it is assumed that Jesus existed
because it is possible for him not to exist, or because of "creativity." Ogden and Ford are aware of the
contingency of particular events within the world; however, both do not address the question of how
particular events arise in order to work either with or without God in becoming special acts.

O'Donell

points out that "process theology denies any being or ground save God alone which is the necessary
ground of whatever is or is even possible.,,237 Thus, "for any event given actual world of creatures, that
world was itself created 'out of nothing' in the sense that there once was when it was not.,,238 Therefore,
"any given world then is a co-creation. ,,239 A particular event "creates itself out of the data of its world
with the help of God's initial which are the source novelty.,,240 God cannot be seen, however, as the
Creator of the particular event's existence. It is illogical to assume that some creature can exist without
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God, yet is dependent upon Him for its co-creation. Ogden and Ford would have us to believe that Jesus
was dependent upon God for his co-creation while at the same time they would have us to believe that the
existence of Jesus is a given or an instance of creativity.
In conclusion, the concept of revelation relative to Ogden and Ford is illogical. They both propound

that there is no beginning to the temporal process and that the world never had a beginning in time. There
was never a time when God was without some world. "Because of panentheism241 unmitigated stress
upon the change and process that characterizes everything, including God, it is difficult to see how the
God of process thought can retain any identity.,,241 Traditionalists point out that in order for God's
revelation to human persons to be special or decisive, there must be something that can ground His
existence. Ronald Nash says, what "reason then have Christians today to believe that the God they
worship is the same God worshipped by Moses and revealed by Jesus Christ?,,242 Even the appeal to
Sabellianism or Modalism (both maintain that God is abstract but can manifest Himself in various
modes) cannot do justice to this claim. Moreover, human persons need some type of ground for their
existence. A particular event cannot simply spring up from anywhere. Process theology as a system
basically says that nothing can be special because of natural processes, and if something could be special
it could not remain special since everything changes. Process theism is illogical and will forever remain
so.
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